culpably ignorant, engaged in what they thought were seemingly harmless behaviors without consciously recognizing they were doing anything wrong: the mortgage lenders who only vaguely understood that buyers couldn't afford the homes they wanted, the analysts who created mortgagebacked securities without understanding the ripple effect of such a product, the traders who sold the securities without grasping their complexity, the bankers who lent too much, and the regulators biased by the lobbying efforts and campaign donations of investment banks. The crisis also involves the multitude of people who were aware of the unethical behavior of others, yet did little or nothing in response, assuming perhaps that "someone smarter than them understood how it all worked," as BusinessWeek speculated. While we support efforts to encourage more ethical decisions within organizations, the results of these efforts have been decidedly mixed. One influential study of diversity programs even found that creating diversity programs-an organizational attempt to "do the right thing"-has a negative impact on the subsequent diversity of organizations.
3 Moreover, such interventions are nothing new. Many similar changes have been made in the past to address ethical indiscretions. Despite these expensive interventions, new ethical scandals continue to emerge.
Similarly, ethics programs have grown at a rapid rate at business historically and is currently being used, the answer to that question is no.
Ethics interventions have failed and will continue to fail because they are predicated on a false assumption: that individuals recognize an ethical dilemma when it is presented to them. Ethics training presumes that emphasizing the moral components of decisions will inspire executives to choose the moral path. But the common assumption this training is based on-that executives make explicit trade-offs between behaving ethically and earning profits for their organizations-is incomplete. This paradigm fails to acknowledge our innate psychological responses when faced with an ethical dilemma.
Findings from the emerging field of behavioral ethics-a field that seeks to understand how people actually behave when confronted with ethical dilemmas-offer insights that can round out our understanding of why we often behave contrary to our best ethical intentions. Our ethical behavior is often inconsistent, at times even hypocritical. Consider that people have the innate ability to maintain a belief while acting contrary to it. 5 Moral hypocrisy occurs when individuals' evaluations of their own moral transgressions differ substantially from their evaluations of the same transgressions committed by others. In one research study, participants were divided into two groups. In one condition, participants were required to distribute a resource (such as time or energy) to themselves and another person and could make the distribution fairly or unfairly.
The "allocators" were then asked to evaluate the ethicality of their actions.
In the other condition, participants viewed another person acting in an unfair manner and subsequently evaluated the ethicality of this act. Individuals who made an unfair distribution perceived this transgression to be less objectionable than did those who saw another person commit the same transgression. 6 This widespread double standard-one rule for ourselves, a different one for others-is consistent with the gap that often exists between who we are and who we think that we should be.
Traditional approaches to ethics, and the traditional training methods that have accompanied such approaches, lack an understanding of the unintentional yet predictable cognitive patterns that result in unethical behavior. By contrast, our research on bounded ethicality focuses on the psychological processes that lead even good people to engage in ethically questionable behavior that contradicts their own preferred ethics. Bounded ethicality comes into play when individuals make decisions that harm others and when that harm is inconsistent with these decision makers' conscious beliefs and preferences. If ethics training is to actually change and improve ethical decision making, it needs to incorporate behavioral ethics, and specifically the subtle ways in which our ethics are bounded.
Such an approach entails an understanding of the different ways our minds can approach ethical dilemmas and the different modes of decision making that result.
We have no strong opinion as to whether or not you, personally, are an ethical person. Rather, we aim to alert you to the blind spots that prevent all of us from seeing the gap between our own actual behavior and our desired behavior. In this book, we will provide substantial evidence that our ethical judgments are based on factors outside of our awareness.
We will explore the implicit psychological processes that contribute to the gap between goals and behavior, as well as the role that organizations and political environments play in widening this divide. We will also offer tools to help weight important ethical decisions with greater reflection and less bias-at the individual level, the organizational level, and the societal level. We will then offer interventions that can more effectively improve the morality of decision making at each of these three levels. given such an easy, unverifiable opportunity to do so. These people aren't likely to factor this type of cheating into their assessments of their ethical character; instead, they leave the experiment with their positive self-image intact.
The notion that we experience gaps between who we believe ourselves to be and who we actually are is related to the problem of bounded awareness. Bounded awareness refers to the common tendency to exclude important and relevant information from our decisions by placing arbitrary and dysfunctional bounds around our definition of a problem. 10 Bounded awareness results in the systematic failure to see information that is relevant to our personal lives and professional obligations. As the Dalmatian picture demonstrates, we are "boundedly aware": our perceptions and decision making are constrained in ways we don't realize. In addition to falling prey to bounded awareness, recent research finds we are also subject to bounded ethicality, or systematic constraints on our morality that favor our own self-interest at the expense of the interest of others. As an example, a colleague of Ann's once mentioned that she had decided not to vaccinate her children given a perceived potential connection between vaccines and autism. After noting that this was a decision her colleague had a right to make, Ann suggested that she might be overweighing the risks of the vaccine in comparison to the risk of the disease. Ann also raised the possibility that her colleague was not fully considering the impact of her decision on others, particularly immunecompromised children who could die if they contracted diseases as commonplace as chicken pox from unvaccinated children. Several days later, Ann's colleague mentioned that she was rethinking her decision not to vaccinate her children, as she had never considered the other children who might be affected by her decision.
The psychological study of the mistakes of the mind helps to explain why a parent might overweigh the risks of a vaccine relative to the risk of a disease for the sake of her or his own child. Going a step further, bounded ethicality helps to explain how a parent might act in ways that violate her own ethical standards-by putting other people's children in dangerwithout being aware that she is doing so. We will explore how psychological tendencies produce this type of accidental unethical behavior.
Philosopher Peter Singer's book The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to
End World Poverty provides ample documentation of how our limited awareness restricts our charitable giving and even our willingness to think about many ethical problems. 11 He opens his book with the following problem:
On your way to work, you pass a small pond. On hot days, children sometimes play in the pond, which is only about knee-deep. The weather's cool today, though, and the hour is early, so you are surprised to see a child splashing about in the pond. As you get closer, you see that it is a very young child, just a toddler, who is flailing about, unable to stay upright or walk out of the pond. You look for the parents or babysitter, but there is no one else around. The child is unable to keep his head above the water for more than a few seconds at a time. If you don't wade in and pull him out, he seems likely to drown. Wading in is easy and safe, but you will ruin the new shoes you bought only a few days ago, and get your suit wet and muddy. By the time you hand the child over to someone responsible for him, and change your clothes, you'll be late for work. What should you do?
Chapter 1 Singer notes that most people see this as an easy problem to solve. Clearly, one should jump in and save the child, as failing to do so would be a massive ethical failure. Singer then goes on to describe a challenge described by a man in Ghana:
Take the death of this small boy this morning, for example. The boy died of measles. We all know he could have been cured at the hospital. But the parents had no money and so the boy died a slow and painful death, not of measles but out of poverty. Think about something like that happening 27,000 times every day. Some children die because they don't have enough to eat. More die, like that small boy in Ghana, from measles, malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia, conditions that either don't exist in developed nations, or, if they do, are almost never fatal. The children are vulnerable to these diseases because they have no safe drinking water, or no sanitation, and because when they do fall ill, their parents can't afford any medical treatment.
UNICEF, Oxfam, and many other organizations are working to reduce poverty and provide clean water and basic health care, and these efforts are reducing the toll. If the relief organizations had more money, they could do more, and more lives would be saved.
While one could quibble about whether the two stories are perfectly parallel, most people feel uncomfortable when reading this second story (we know that we were). In fact, the stories are quite similar, except for one difference. In the first, you would likely be aware of any gap that arises between what you should do and what you actually do: you should save the boy, and if you do not, it will be obvious to you that you failed to meet your own ethical standards. In the second example, your ethical blinders are firmly in place. Most people likely would be ashamed if they knew they had failed to save a life for a relatively small amount of money, yet most of us do exactly that. We will explore the psychological tendencies that produce those blind spots and suggest ways to remove them.
As another example, take the case of Bernard Madoff. Over the course of three decades, Madoff's Ponzi scheme racked up enormous losses: more than 15,000 claims approaching $300 million in damages, and $64.8 billion in paper profit was wiped out. Madoff sold most of his investments through feeder funds-that is, other funds that either marketed their access to Madoff to potential investors or claimed they had access to some exotic investment strategy. In reality, the feeder funds were doing nothing more than turning much of the money they collected over to Madoff. participant in Milgram's study played the role of "teacher," while a study confederate (someone trained by the experimenter) played the role of "learner." The learner was portrayed as a forty-seven-year-old accountant.
The teacher and learner were physically separated, such that the teacher could not see the learner. The teacher was told that it was his job to administer shocks of increasing magnitude, ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, as the learner made mistakes in a task requiring the matching of word pairs.
The learner did make mistakes on the task, requiring the confederate to administer shocks. Up to 150 volts, occasional grunts were heard from the other side of the wall where the learner was located. (The learner was not actually receiving shocks; he was an actor.) At 150 volts, the learner shouted that he wanted to stop the experiment and let out some cries of pain. If the teacher resisted continuing, the experimenter insisted that the experiment must go on. From 150 to 300 volts, the teacher heard the learner as he pleaded to be released and complained about his heart condition. At 300 volts, the learner banged on the wall and demanded to be released. After 300 volts, the learner was completely silent.
Milgram surveyed psychiatrists, graduate students, behavioral science faculty members, college sophomores, and middle-class adults about their expectations of how study participants playing the role of the teacher would respond during the study. Across groups, survey respondents predicted that nearly all teachers would stop administering shocks well short of 450 volts. The psychiatrists predicted that nearly all teachers would refuse to move beyond the 150-volt level and that only one in a thousand participants would go all the way to 450 volts. In fact, in the actual study, 65 percent of those playing the role of teacher went all the way to 450 volts. 12 These powerful results show that our ethical behavior is distinctly different from our expectations of our own behavior. While many teachers were visibly upset and angry during the study, they nonetheless submitted to the experimenter's authority.
Milgram's study was replicated multiple times with more than 1,000 study participants. While the full experiment could not be replicated today,
given much more stringent rules on the treatment of experimental sub-jects, a recent replication found that over 70 percent of contemporary study participants were willing to deliver at least 150 volts. In helping you to bring your own ethical gaps to light, we will expose you to the psychological processes that create your blind spots. More important, we identify effective strategies that take these psychological processes into account-including anticipating the influence of your impulses and learning how to accurately assess and learn from your past behavior. By removing common blinders, you can learn to do what you would think is right upon greater reflection.
What about Your Organization? The Implications of Ethical Gaps for Organizations
Because of the potential for widespread disaster, ethical gaps at the individual level are compounded when considered at the organizational level.
One compelling example is the 1986 explosion of the Challenger space On January 27, 1986, the night before the launch, engineers and managers from NASA and from shuttle contractor Morton Thiokol met to discuss whether it was safe to launch the Challenger at a low temperature.
In In the caucus that followed, "No one in management wanted to discuss the facts," writes an incensed Boisjoly. 18 In his opinion, his superiors were primarily focused on pleasing their customer, NASA, which had placed Morton Thiokol in the position of proving that it was not safe to fly rather than the more typical default of not launching until there was reason to believe it was safe to fly. 19 "The managers were struggling to make a list of data that would support a launch decision," Boisjoly writes, "but unfortunately for them, the data actually supported a no-launch deci- What about Society? The Implications of Ethical
Gaps for Society
Policy decisions may be the most important set of decisions we make as a society. Yet, in this realm, blind spots can play an active, dysfunctional role without our conscious awareness. 22 For example, consider the case of organ donation, adapted from a problem that Max wrote with his colleagues:
Which option do you prefer?
A. If you die in an accident, your heart and other organs will be used to save other lives. In addition, if you ever need an organ transplant, there will be a 90 percent chance that you will get the organ.
B. If you die in an accident, you will be buried with your heart and other organs in your body. In addition, if you ever need an organ transplant, there will be a 45 percent chance that you will get the organ.
Most of us have a reflexive preference for option A. That's a good thing, as a change in the U.S. organ donation system to one resembling option A could save up to 6,000 lives per year in the United States aloneroughly twice as many people as were killed in the 9/11 attacks. Nonetheless, the United States continues to follow an organ donation policy that looks more like option B. Why? In the United States, if you die in an accident and have made no explicit decision about your organs, you will be buried (or cremated) with your organs intact. If you want to donate your organs, you need to proactively opt in to the donation system (typically, when you renew your driver's license). In contrast, in many European nations, if you make no explicit decision about organ donation, your organs are available for harvesting. In these countries, you need to proactively opt out of the system if you want to keep your organs after death. In both cases, you have a choice, assuming you stop to think about it and fill out the right form accordingly, but the default option differs. The opt-in system roughly creates option B, while the opt-out system roughly creates option A.
As figure 2 shows, the default option leads to large and appalling differences in donation rates across counties. What about the United States?
Our organ donation consent rate is 44 percent-pretty good for an opt-in tions, it is because Sweden gives the survivors of the deceased a greater opportunity to decline to donate.)
The number of lives that potentially could be saved in the United
States-6,000 annually-from a simple change in the laws is a poignant example of the role that society can play in creating and perpetuating blind spots. While there may be insightful, honest people who are opposed to organ donation for religious or moral reasons, our focus is on the plethora of citizens and leaders who would prefer option A upon reflection, yet who stand by while our nation continues to resort to option B. In his memoir, Swimming Across, Andy Grove, the former chairperson of Intel, described facing this very problem when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1995. Grove had the resources, financial and otherwise, to find the best cure possible. He set about meeting with top physicians representing each of the three possible courses of treatment recommended to him. Each physician strongly recommended that Grove undertake the type of intervention that he or she would personally perform.
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At the heart of this situation is an ethical dilemma. Consider that each doctor is likely to view the problem in terms of advising the patient on the best possible treatment available, without seeing the problem as one with ethical import. At the same time, each doctor is biased toward advocating a treatment plan based on his or her own area of expertise. The dilemma isn't that doctors are lying to patients in order to drum up business.
Clearly, doctors have strong convictions about their recommendations.
They treat the same illness, yet each believes his or her preferred treatment is superior, and they fail to recognize that their beliefs are biased in a self-serving manner. In other words, they don't recognize that they're facing an ethical dilemma: whether to recommend their treatment or the best treatment for this patient. They fail to realize that their training, incentives, and preferences prevent them from offering objective advice.
Conflicts of interest have captured the attention of the medical community, and in Washington, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has condemned medical schools and other organizations for not doing more to address the issue. Under our current system, doctors have financial incentives to prescribe drugs and treatments that are not in the best interest of the patient. Yet most smart, well-educated doctors are puzzled by the criticism against them, as they are confident in their own ethicality and the "fact" that they always put their patients' interests first. Similarly, there is no single explanation for ethical dilemmas; rather, blind spots form at several levels of analysis: individual, organizational, and societal.
At the individual level, as we have already suggested, we fall prey to psychological processes that bias our decisions-and, more importantly, we don't know they are biased.
At the organizational level, business leaders typically fail to appreciate the role of bounded ethicality in their employees' decisions. Furthermore, they typically believe that their employees' integrity will protect them and the organization from ethical infractions. Yet many ethical infractions are rooted in the intricacies of human psychology rather than integrity. To design wise interventions, leaders need to consider the ways in which their current environment could prompt unethical action without the decision maker's conscious awareness.
At the societal level, when individuals and their organizations cannot or will not solve these problems, doing so becomes the job of the federal government. When the government fails to grapple with the bounded ethicality of individuals, organizations, and industries, effective solutions will remain out of reach. Across industries, the psychological processes that lead to ethical fading and bounded ethicality must be considered.
Doing so requires making changes to societal defaults that highlight the value trade-offs we are making and draw attention to future concerns.
What's to Come
In this chapter, we have deliberately avoided offering a definition of the term "ethics" or distinguishing between ethics and morality. You can find such definitions and distinctions elsewhere. We don't claim to hold the key to what constitutes moral truth, and we have no interest in changing your ethics to match our own. 28 Rather than presenting our own ideas of what constitutes ethical or moral behavior, we are interested in highlighting the broad array of reasons that people behave in ways that may be inconsistent with their own personal values.
We also have no interest in constraining the advice of physicians or any other group of experts. It would be overly simplistic to remind trained professionals that their decisions should be based on the best interest of their patients, clients, and constituents rather than on financial incentives. Rather, our motive is to convince individuals-including physicians, CEOs, accountants, consultants, politicians, and all citizens-that they are affected by blind spots that prevent them from meeting their own ethical standards. Most of us behave ethically most of the time. At other times, we are aware when we behave unethically. This book focuses on more dangerous situations: the times when we unwittingly behave unethically. Chapter 2 will connect our perspective to existing theories of ethical thought. In chapter 3, we will caution you about bounded ethicality and the internal limits the human mind places on ethical behavior. In chapter 4, we will expose the mental tricks that lead to ethical fading. In chapter 5, we will present evidence that our ethical blinders not only prevent us from seeing our own ethical gaps, but also the ethical gaps of
